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Abstract— Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are drawing a 
crescent interest in hardware oriented security due to their 
special characteristics of simplicity and safety. However, their 
nature as well as early stage of study makes them constitute 
currently a diverse and non-standardized set for designers. This 
work tries to establish one organization of existing PUF 
structures, giving guidelines for their choice, conditioning, and 
adaptation depending on the target application. In particular, it 
is described how using PUFs adequately could enlighten 
significantly most of the security primitives, making them very 
suitable for authenticating constrained resource platforms. 
Keywords-PUFs; hardware security; light cryptography 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Microelectronics and Telecommunications have 
undertaken an incredible evolution during last decades. This 
together with the social trend of globalization and so ubiquity, 
derived in the amazing development of integrated circuits 
(ICs) for multiple applications. In parallel, the market of the 
Intellectual Property (IP) is growing in a spectacular manner 
due to the evolution of FPGAs. Both, ICs and FPGAs, include 
each time more capabilities among which we can find security 
features. Security issues range from IC identification and IP 
protection in FPGAs to trusted computing and cryptographic 
aspects. Regarding the latter, several tasks are required, such 
as secret-key storage, key distribution or key generation, 
including secure protocols to authenticate communication 
extremes as well as messages, which is particularly relevant in 
the case of hardware tokens for individual authentication. 
From their introduction by Pappu in 2001 [1], security 
community has paid great attention to PUFs (Physical 
Unclonable Functions or Physical Random Functions). They 
have been considered as a key aspect in security for their 
unclonability, randomness, and resiliency against physical 
attacks (e.g., radiation and reverse engineering). The original 
proposal in [1] was based on the scattering obtained when 
shining a laser on a bubble-filled transparent epoxy wafer. 
Later on, Gassend et al. introduced silicon PUFs [2], which 
exploit manufacturing process variations in ICs, that is, 
random variables of the fabrication process, which during 
many years were seen as a problem for circuit design, are now 
utilized for security purposes. Process variations introduced 
during the manufacturing process are beyond the control of 
manufacturers and increase with submicron technologies. 
Hence, silicon PUFs can be obtained without any special 
manufacturing steps. In addition, their simple structures 
introduce much lower time, speed, and power overheads than 
other cryptography-based security techniques. 
The problem is that current PUF-based applications 
constitute a heterogeneous space where most of the systems 
are designed ‘ad-hoc’. Consequently, someone wishing to 
understand this field may be confused by the variety of PUFs 
reported and the different scenarios where they can be 
employed. 
This paper summarizes the use of PUFs for hardware 
authentication. Section II is dedicated to describe briefly what a 
PUF is and how it can be used for authentication purposes. 
Section III shows the PUF structures reported in the literature 
classified accordingly to its working principle. Section IV 
describes configurations to enhance their security while Section 
V reviews basic structures based on PUFs for IC identification, 
random number generation, secret key generation, and physical 
obfuscating a secret. Section VI illustrates how these primitives 
can be exploited to implement secure authentication protocols, 
in particular, in a low-cost protocol, which is adequate for 
security hardware tokens. Finally some conclusions are given 
in Section VII. 
II. PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS 
A PUF is a Physical Random Function that maps a set of 
challenges to a set of responses driven by parametric properties 
of physical components that are difficult to predict, control, or 
reproduce. Therefore, the mapping function can only be 
evaluated with the physical system, and it is unique for each 
physical instance. Pappu [1] defined a PUF as a physical object 
with the following properties: 
 It can be subjected to a large number of different 
challenges that yield unpredictable responses. 
 It is very hard to clone physically. 
 Mathematical modeling of the challenge-response 
pairs is very difficult. 
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 It is hard to characterize its physical structure. 
The first property aims at avoiding statistical attacks based 
on prediction and replay attacks that look for repeated 
challenges. Regarding this issue, predictability tests (which 
measure relationships between challenge-response pairs) are 
very interesting for PUFs [3]. The other properties reduce the 
problem of model-building attacks, that is, attackers find it 
difficult to construct a software or hardware model of a PUF 
from evaluating challenge-response pairs. Anyway, model-
building attacks are not a concern whenever the challenges or 
the responses are not exposed, which happens in several 
application scenarios. 
In order to use PUFs in authentication systems, they 
should fulfill the following statistical properties: 
 Inter-class Hamming variation should be ideally of 
µ=50% with a typical deviation of σ=0%. The 
Hamming inter-class distance represents the 
difference between two responses of different PUFs to 
the same challenge. This property measures the PUF 
uniqueness, that is, how distinctly the PUF can 
identify the circuit where it is included. 
 Intra-class Hamming variation should be ideally of 
µ=0% with a typical deviation of σ=0%. The 
Hamming intra-class distance represents the 
difference between two responses of one PUF to the 
same challenge. This property measures the PUF 
reliability, that is, how consistently a response is 
reproduced by the PUF for the same challenge over 
several read outs. 
These properties should be verified ideally independently 
of aging and environmental conditions (varying temperature, 
fluctuating supply voltage, and so on). Hence, sensitivity tests 
of the PUFs are very important [3]. 
III. CLASSIFICATION OF PUFS 
First step in the selection of a PUF is to know the 
alternatives together with the arguments for and against each of 
them. Next classification firstly divides PUFs into two different 
groups: those that can only be implemented in ICs with special 
fabrication steps, and those that can be implemented in both 
FPGAs and ICs of standard manufacturing processes. Within 
each group, the types of PUFs are clustered accordingly to the 
manufacturing variability parameter that determines their 
working mode.  
A. PUFs requiring special fabrication process 
They are based on the measurements taken from one 
special layer of deposed material that contains particular 
embedded elements. The type of elements and the 
measurement mode establish the difference between them. 
 Coating PUFs [4]: One layer of dielectric material 
containing dielectric particles of different permittivity 
is deposed over an IC (Fig. 1). Between the coating 
layer and the rest of the IC an array of sensors is 
placed to measure the capacitance of the layer 
(response). This way the measurement circuit is 
protected by the layer from inspection. Coating PUFs 
have a small number of challenge-response pairs 
because the amount of sensors is limited and every 
sensor yields only a few bits.  
 Optical PUFs [5]: The PUF is formed by a piece of 
glass that contains light scattering particles. If it is 
irradiated with, e.g. a laser beam, different patterns 
(responses) are obtained. The physical structure can 
be optionally integrated with the laser and the reading 
device into an IC. A disadvantage of these PUFs is 
that it is difficult to evaluate their uniqueness and 
ensure a good reliability. 
B. Silicon PUFs 
The working principle of silicon PUFs [2] is exploitation of 
small variations in the IC manufacturing process. The 
parameter selected will define the resulting type of PUF. 
 Leakage current based PUFs [6]: They are based on 
the idea that different physical realizations of the same 
circuit have different leakage current consumption. 
Their measure and binarization provide different 
digital responses for each selected circuit. 
 Delay based PUFs: Even using identical layout 
masks, manufacturing variability cause different 
delays in different realizations of the same circuit. The 
main constructions are: 
- Arbiter PUFs: They contain two paths with the 
same layout length that are selected by a 
multiple-bit input (challenge) via multiplexors 
(Fig. 2a). Given a rising signal to both paths at 
the same time, the signals race through them until 
an arbiter (latch) at the end decides which one is 
faster, thus giving a different output (response) 
[7]. There is one variant to this scheme called 
tristate buffer [8] where the multiplexors are 
replaced by pairs of tristate buffers. Since arbiter 
PUFs are very simple, they are very suitable for 
resource-constrained applications. As a 
drawback, attackers can build a precise timing 
model of them from challenge-response pairs. 
- Ring oscillator PUFs: They are formed by a set 
of identical ring oscillators that oscillate at 
slightly different frequencies due to variations in 
the fabrication process (Fig. 2.b) [7]. Advantages 
of these PUFs compared with arbiter ones are an 
 
 
Figure 1. Transversal section of  a coating PUF [4] 
easier implementation for both ASICs and 
FPGAs, easier evaluation of entropy, and higher 
uniqueness and reliability. As disadvantages, they 
are slower, larger, and consume more power than 
arbiter PUFs. 
 Memory based PUFs: They are based on cross-
coupled circuits that have two different stable 
operating points and one unstable point. If the circuit 
is not driven by any input, the slight differences 
(mismatching) between the two ideally symmetrical 
parts motivate the circuit goes more often to one of 
the stable states. Every memory element yields one 
response bit, so that a challenge-response behavior 
can be mimicked by using more memory cells than 
response bits. The drawback is that the hardware 
resources scale exponentially with the challenge size. 
The advantage is that they are superior to delay PUFs 
in speed and power consumption. 
- SRAM PUFs: They were the first practical PUFs 
devoted to FPGAs since they are intrinsic in 
many FPGAs [9]-[10]. A disadvantage is that an 
attacker could read initial value of every memory 
location in the device. Another disadvantage is 
that not all the FPGAs support uninitialized 
SRAM memory. 
- Butterfly and NOR-based PUFs: They are based 
on cross-coupled latches [11] (Fig. 2c) or NOR 
gates (Fig. 2d) [12]. They are not intrinsic PUFs 
but can be implemented in standard FPGAs or 
ASICs. 
Table 1 summarizes the measurements that have been 
reported for the different PUFs reviewed in this section. 
Current research is being conducted towards improving 
reliability and reducing sensitivity [13]. This is why the 
measurements shown for Ring Oscillator PUFs are so good. 
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   Figure 2. Structures of (a) Arbiter PUF, (b) Ring oscillator PUF, (c) Butterfly PUF, and (d) NOR-based PUF 
 
TABLE I.  MEASUREMENTS REPORTED OF DIFFERENT PUFS 
PUF Type 
PUF Quality Factors 
Inter-class 
Hamming 
Distance 
Intra-class 
Hamming 
Distance 
Sensitivity to environment Implementation 
Difficulty Ageing Temperature Voltage 
Coating [4] µ=50% µ=4.4% - Very high - High 
Optical [5] Impractical to measure Very high - Very high - Very high 
Leakage Current [6] 
(180 nm) µ=50% µ=2% - Very high Very high Medium 
Arbiter [7] 
(180 nm) µ=23% µ=0.7% 
0.7% 
Intra-class 
4.82%  
(20 to 70ºC) 
3.74% 
(2% ΔV) Low 
Ring Oscillator [13] 
(90 nm) µ=45.51% µ=0% - 
0% 
(25 to 65ºC) 
3.15% 
(20% ΔV) Very low 
SRAM [9]-[10] 
(90 nm) 
µ=49.97% 
σ=0.3% 
µ=3.57% 
σ=0.13% 
4.5% 
Intra-class 
12% 
(-20 to 80ºC) - Very low 
Butterfly [11] 
(65 nm) µ=50% µ=6% - 
2.3% 
(-20 to 80ºC) - Very low 
NOR [12] 
(130 nm) 
µ=50.13% 
σ=0.6% 
µ=3.89% 
σ=0.21% 
4% 
Intra-class 
3.91% 
(0 to 70ºC) 
5.47% 
(20% ΔV) Low 
IV. ENHANCING SECURITY OF PUFS 
Some constructions using PUFs have been proposed in 
order to improve security parameters. One of them is the 
concept of Reconfigurable PUF (RPUF) proposed by Lim in 
[14]. Another is the concept of Controlled PUF (CPUF), which 
was introduced by Gassend et al. in [15]. 
A. Reconfigurable PUFs (RPUFs) 
Opposite to non reconfigurable PUFs, RPUFs show a 
dynamic performance that is obtained through an ideally 
unpredictable mechanism that alters the challenge-response 
behavior of the PUF and produces a new PUF that inherits all 
the security properties of the original. 
The approach reported in [5] to obtain a reconfigurable 
optical PUF consists in modifying the PUF structure. The 
reconfiguration process is driven by a laser with high intensity 
that makes the glass material of the PUF melt. After cooling 
the structure, light scattering particles experiment 
reorientations, thus providing different challenge-response 
behavior in the moment of being irradiated. 
Another approach reported in [16] is to use two 
reconfigurable networks with a group of PUFs in parallel. An 
input network that makes one mapping of the input challenges 
to the PUFs, and an output network that combines the output of 
the parallel PUFs to obtain the output of the system. The PUF 
is reconfigured by changing the mapping and combining 
functions.  
B. Controlled PUFs (CPUFs) 
A CPUF is defined in [15] as a PUF combined with a 
general-purpose processing element that controls the access to 
the PUF through a specific application programming interface 
(Fig. 3). The processing element protects PUF against man-in-
the-middle attacks because only authorized users by the control 
algorithm have access to the PUF’s inputs and outputs.  In the 
meantime, the PUF provides anti-tampering protection. The 
interface proposed in [15] for limiting access to PUFs can be 
applied to different scenarios. 
V.    SECURITY PRIMITIVES USING PUFS 
This section summarizes four main primitives that use 
PUFs for hardware authentication: (i) creation of identification 
number (ID), (ii) random number generation, (iii) secret key 
generation, and (iv) physical obfuscation of secrets. 
A. PUFs for ID creation 
Uniquely identifying ICs by an identification number (ID) 
is important for labeling RFID tags, addressing resource-
constrained wireless sensor nodes, controlling the quality of IC 
fabrication process, or tracking implantable electronic devices. 
Advantages of using PUFs for ID creation are that the ID 
number is difficult to counterfeit, which is very important 
because counterfeiting is a current huge problem that not only 
produces economic losses but also threatens safety and health. 
The PUFs used in this application scenario must generate a 
digital output to form a binary ID code, and the output must be 
reliable over environmental changes. 
A sort of leakage current based PUFs are employed in [6] 
for this purpose. The leakage current value of a cell is 
continuous or analog, and so, the key point in this work is the 
conversion of the analog value into a digital one. Such 
conversion is done in two steps. Firstly, the model of the cell 
leakage is obtained and then these values are codified to obtain 
the ID number. 
NOR based PUFs are employed in [12]. The ID is directly 
obtained by combining the output bits of several basic cells as 
the one shown in Fig. 2d. This solution is very efficient in 
terms of readout speed and power consumption. In order to 
increase the reliability of PUF output, they suggest reducing 
the influence of unstable bits by: (a) averaging multiple reads 
to attenuate the effects of thermal noise, (b) increasing the ID 
code length, or (c) increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of the 
circuit evaluation process. 
B. PUFs for random number generation 
Random numbers are the basis of most of the primitives 
and algorithms used in the security world. Approaches to 
creating random numbers can be classified into two 
categories: True Random Number Generation (TRNG) and 
Pseudo Random Number Generation (PRNG). PRNGs 
produce numbers that are random from a statistical point of 
view, although they are fully deterministic. TRNGs, which 
rely on a physical random process as a source of entropy, are 
desirable for security applications. 
O’Donnell et al. proposed in [17] the use of silicon PUFs 
(arbiter PUFs) to generate random numbers. The underlying 
idea is to use challenges that return inconsistent responses, 
that is, the opposite to what is desired for achieving PUF 
reliability. These meta-stable challenges generate responses 
that can vary unpredictably. Attention should be paid to 
environmental changes because they are much more 
influential to this meta-stable behavior. Ring-oscillator [18] 
and memory based PUFs [19]-[20] have also been used for 
random number generation. 
C.  PUFs for secret key generation 
PUFs are a good option for secret key generation as they 
provide security against Side Channel Attacks. In this 
application scenario, the reliability of the PUF is very 
important because the response provided to the same 
challenge should always be the same. Helper Data or Fuzzy 
Extractor Algorithms have been employed to cope with noisy 
PUF responses [21]. They consist of the following phases: 
 Enrollment: A helper data vector, W, is generated 
from the PUF response, R, added (usually XORed) to 
one codeword c, which is chosen randomly from an 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Block diagram of a CPUF
error correction code (ECC) C. The helper data can 
be made public while the codeword must be private. 
 
 Key reconstruction: This phase consists of two steps 
named ‘information reconciliation’ and ‘privacy 
amplification’. In the first step, the PUF is challenged 
as in the enrollment, now obtaining a probably noisy 
response, R’. This output is subtracted to the helper 
data (usually XOR(W,R’) is used) and the result goes 
through the ECC decoding to recover the codeword c. 
From c, the original PUF response, R, can be 
reconstructed (R = XOR(W,c)). In the ‘privacy 
amplification’ step, a hash function is used to 
generate the key so as to provide well randomness. 
 
An example of secret key generation scheme using PUFs 
is given in Fig. 4. 
D. PUFs  for physical obfuscating a secret 
Gassend et al. in [22] propose a scheme called physical 
obfuscated key (POK) for achieving secret key storage. The 
underling idea of POK is to split the computation of the key 
into two steps and relate one of them to a PUF. For example, 
the key is obtained by combining (via an XOR) the output of 
the PUF with some fuse or any data stored in an EEPROM. 
The complete key is not stored permanently but it is accessible 
only after the PUF is stimulated. Once erased from volatile 
memory, the value of the key is no longer available. In this 
scenario, a fixed hard-wired challenge is applied to the PUF so 
as to make the PUF response ideally the same. Hence, the 
other data combined with the PUF should be changed in order 
to change the key. 
Tuyls et al. in [23] describes another scheme based on 
PUFs for secret key storage. A long-term key is stored in a 
non-secure memory. The short-term key used for encrypting 
the long-term key is extracted from the PUF. In this scenario, 
many challenges are applied to the PUF so as to generate 
different short-term keys every time the PUF is used. 
Bringer et al. in [24] propose extending the use of 
physical obfuscation to binary operations such as XOR, AND, 
and scalar product, and apply them for obfuscating the secret 
material of linear as well as non linear stream ciphers. 
VI. PUFS FOR SECURE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
 Several protocols have been proposed that use PUFs in 
order to provide security features. Most of them are ‘ad-hoc’ 
structures whose construction depends on the application. 
Guajardo et al. proposed in [10] a symmetric key protocol 
using PUFs as key generators. The construction targets to 
provide IP protection. In the meantime, it ensures 
confidentiality between the system where the IP would be 
implemented and the IP provider. Tuyls et al. also use PUFs as 
key generators in [25]. In this case, PUFs are building blocks 
in an off-line authentication protocol based on asymmetric 
cryptography. Since the target platforms are RFID systems 
with constrained resources, they employ elliptic curves that 
claim to be less resource consuming than other asymmetric 
approaches even they are more complex to develop. 
Hammouri proposed in [26] a lightweight cryptography 
solution called HB-PUF protocol. It is based on merging two 
types of cryptographic primitives: PUFs and Hoper-Blum 
(HB) protocols [27]-[28]. The proposal of Kulseng in [29] also 
follows the idea of implementing minimalistic cryptography 
exploiting PUFs and LSFR registers. Both are symmetric key 
protocols. 
Symmetric key constructions can always be simpler than 
asymmetric ones. In the field of security hardware tokens that 
require low cost implementation, PUFs can be a relevant 
constituent block not only to obstruct replicating the token but 
also to implement symmetric key constructions with low 
hardware resources. Resistance of symmetric key protocols to 
man-in-the-middle attacks (using PUFs or not) depends on the 
secrecy and security employed when sharing secrets in the 
enrollment phase. 
Fig. 5 shows a possible scheme of a mutual (reader and 
token) authentication protocol using PUFs. Several of the 
structures explained above can be used to both enlighten and 
easily implement security features. In particular, they are used 
in the scheme shown in Fig. 5 to:  
 Generate the random challenges (nonces) in each 
authentication part. 
 Generate the secret key, KAB. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Selection of the correct PUF for one defined security 
application could become a tricky task due to the several 
parameters that should be considered. Since variations in the 
manufacturing process and the mapping function associated 
determine the PUF behavior, they should be selected 
accordingly to the implementation target (FPGA or IC) of the 
application and the quality factors required. Depending on the 
security primitive in which the PUF is involved, it might be 
necessary to implement especial algorithms like helper data or 
using other blocks such as fuses. Due to PUF characteristics of 
simplicity and safety, they can be used as relevant constituent 
blocks in authentication systems, especially in hardware 
tokens with constrained resources. 
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 Figure 5. Challenge-response  protocol scheme using  PUFs 
